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ABSTRACT
The Liberal Linguistic Turn: Kymlicka’s Freedom Account Revisited
This article revisits the principal argument Will Kymlicka has developed for a marriage between lib-
eralism and multiculturalism: that the liberal value of freedom requires a cultural context of choice. I 
show that this freedom argument rests on a romantic philosophy of language. Critics of this freedom 
argument have pointed out that it is not necessarily an individual’s own culture that provides free-
dom: any culture could do so. I articulate a romantic-Kymlickean response to this critique by showing 
how individuals’ life choices come to be entwined with the particular culture that provides their 
context of choice. But while that safeguards existing individuals from assimilation, it does not block 
future generations from being introduced into the life-world of an additional cultural context. Such 
slow intergenerational assimilation projects are not necessarily worrisome, however. They can some-
times have the virtue of realizing non-identity values in addition to freedom.
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IZVLEČEK
Liberalni lingvistični obrat: pregled Kymlickovega argumenta svobode
Članek ponovno premisli glavni Kymlickin argument zveze med liberalizmom in multikulturalizmom: da 
liberalno vrednotenje svobode zahteva kulturni kontekst izbire. Hkrati članek pokaže, da ta argument 
svobode temelji na romantični filozofiji jezika. Kritiki  omenjenega argumenta so namreč poudarili, da 
svobode ne zagotavlja nujno posameznikova lastna kultura, temveč jo lahko omogoči katerakoli kultu-
ra. Avtor na omenjene kritike poda romantično-Kymlickijanski odgovor, s katerim pokaže prepletenost 
posameznikovih življenjskih odločitev s tisto kulturo, ki določa njegov kontekst izbire. Toda medtem 
ko ta današnje posameznike varuje pred asimilacijo, prihodnjim generacijam ne preprečuje izbire do-
datnega kulturnega konteksta. Počasni medgeneracijski asimilacijski projekti niso nujno zaskrbljujoči, 
saj lahko poleg omogočanja svobode prispevajo k uresničevanju z identiteto nepovezanih vrednot.
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INTRODUCTION
Like many scholars working on questions of ethnocultural justice, I have been, and remain, fascinated 
by the work of Will Kymlicka. His books Liberalism, Community and Culture and Multicultural Citizenship 
are to the field of ethnocultural justice what Rawls’s Theory of Justice is to justice in general: they consti-
tute a paradigm that maps the normative issues and provides a comprehensive moral outlook. Scholars 
interested in these questions cannot ignore that paradigm. 
In this paper, for a commemorative volume celebrating the 25th anniversary of Liberalism, Commu-
nity and Culture, I critically examine the central argument Kymlicka gives for group-differentiated rights: 
the argument that individual freedom requires a cultural context of choice. 
In section I, argue that the freedom argument is a liberal articulation of a romantic understanding 
of the value of language. In section II, I address an often-phrased objection to the freedom account: 
that it cannot ground a right to a particular culture. I argue that this objection can be overcome because 
it is in reference to a culturally specific choice-set that the life choices of already-existing people have 
been made and continue to be upheld. In section III, I argue that the freedom argument does however 
allow for legitimate nation-building efforts that seek to add contexts of choice to existing contexts.
THE FREEDOM ARGUMENT
Many liberals, especially after World War II, have denied outright the legitimacy of minority rights or 
other forms of group-based recognition. But Will Kymlicka has developed a distinctively liberal defence 
of minority rights. He argues that freedom, of key importance to liberalism, is always embedded in a 
cultural context of choice. In order to freely decide what is valuable in life, people need options to 
choose among. Yet “[i]n deciding how to lead our lives, we do not start de novo” (Kymlicka 1989: 164). 
We reflect upon the values, beliefs and models offered to us within our culture and language, and then 
choose to defend or reject particular values from that given choice-set. Culture and language thus 
function as a context of choice (1989: 164). Our cultural structure makes us aware of the options available 
to us, so that we can examine them and select the ones we find valuable. Language and culture are the 
“media through which we come to an awareness of the options available to us, and their significance; 
and this is a precondition of making intelligent judgments about how to lead our lives” (1989: 165). 
Without our cultural context of choice, we could not meaningfully exercise our capacity for making 
autonomous life choices. “Put simply, freedom involves making choices amongst various options, and 
our societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes them meaningful to us” (1995: 83). 
Therefore, if liberals want to realize individual freedom and autonomy, they need to endorse rather 
than ignore the value of languages and cultures. They ought to recognize that membership of a culture 
is a primary good in the Rawlsian sense (1989: 166). Rawls assumed that the political community is cul-
turally unified. But in cases where this is not the case, such as in multinational states which host more 
than one national-cultural group, group-differentiated rights are warranted, to enable the groups to 
provide their members with a context of choice. In short, the freedom argument serves as the engine 
for Kymlicka’s defence of group-differentiated rights. Such rights enable individual freedom. 
Kymlicka does not historicize this freedom argument; he works it out relying on the work of con-
temporary liberals like Ronald Dworkin (see e.g. 1995: 82–84). Yet, the freedom argument has a sig-
nificant historical pedigree. In particular, it was at the heart of a tradition sometimes referred to as the 
Hamann-Herder-Humboldt view, which also pervades the work of theorists like Hans-Georg Gadamer 
and Charles Taylor (Lafont 1994: 13; Taylor 2016: 48). I will call this tradition in what follows the ‘Romantic 
Tradition’. In the romantic tradition’s philosophy of language, language has a world-disclosing function. 
Language opens up a world of language- and culture-specific meanings. Language is not simply a tool 
by which already fully formed individuals can communicate with others. Language in fact constitutes 
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people by cognitively influencing them: it is through language that people get the information they 
need to develop their own beliefs. Our native language, says Herder, is the first world that we see 
(Herder 1987: 336). The world is not present to everyone in the same way. Instead, languages give 
speakers access to a situated view of the world. As Gadamer argued, to have a world we need to have 
a language (Gadamer 1975: 411).
In this view, language knowledge functions like a key to a room: one needs to speak the language 
to access what is discussed in the room. Once inside the room that the key gives access to, one is 
surrounded by arguments and styles of discussing that are not readily available to people who don’t 
speak the language unless through translators who hold the key to other rooms. Each room is called a 
“life-world”: a set of shared assumptions and ideas about the world. It is this life-world that is disclosed 
through language. For Gadamer, and for Herder and Taylor alike, our experience of the world unfolds 
from within our language (Gadamer 1975: 145). 
It follows that if the interest of individuals in having access to their language and cultural life-world 
is not respected, they cannot fully realize themselves. Herder has argued that if we lose the disposition 
to think in the language in which we are brought up, we lose ourselves, and also the world (Herder XVIII: 
336-337). From this, theorists like Herder and Taylor also drew the conclusion that the world-disclosing 
function of language generates a legitimate justification for policies that seek to explicitly recognize 
and protect languages (see e.g. Herder XVII: 59; Taylor 1993: 46-47; 53–54). People need access to their 
language and cultural tradition in order for them to function well, to receive a (first) position. 
Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalist account of the value of language and cultural membership rests 
on this romantic view of the life-world. For Herder, language and culture function as a psychological 
matrix in which we are raised as social beings (Herder V: 135; Barnard 1965: 57). This is similar to describ-
ing culture (as Kymlicka does relying on Dworkin) as the ‘spectacles’ through which we experience the 
world (Kymlicka 1995: 54). The phrase that culture ‘provides options’, and ‘makes them meaningful to 
us’ (Kymlicka 1995: 83) might as well have been written by Herder.1 Both accounts take it that individuals 
need their language to be able to be full human beings, because individuals do not start and reflect 
upon the world from a view of nowhere, but require cultural and linguistic ‘spectacles’ through which 
they see their world.
So Herder (and his followers) has argued that individuals need to have access to their linguistic and 
national-cultural life-world, which provides them with a “horizon of meaning” that they need in order 
to fully realize themselves (Taylor 1993: 46–47). Kymlicka (and his followers) have argued that individuals 
need access to their linguistic and national-cultural context of choice, which provides them with shared 
options from which they can make autonomous and free life choices. Both hold that language and cul-
ture help structure what we think and choose in life and that this linguistic and cultural structuring 
justifies policies that seek to explicitly accommodate linguistic and cultural groups.
Yet, while the freedom argument is grounded in romantic life-world premises, Kymlicka’s version 
of multiculturalism is not a replica of the romantic tradition. Kymlicka articulates an explicitly liberal 
version of the romantic ‘linguistic turn’. As a liberal, Kymlicka integrates the romantic conception of 
the value of language and culture into an explicitly liberal framework. This liberalization changes the 
argument in two ways. First, it means that the freedom argument is articulated with liberal premis-
es: language and cultural membership are presented as necessary for the liberal value of freedom. 
Since language and culture structure our life options, and since liberals care about enabling individual 
choices, liberals have a reason to give people access to language and culture. Second, liberalizing the 
argument implies imposing liberal limits on what can be tolerated in the name of securing access to 
linguistic and cultural membership. For example, ‘internal restrictions’, by which a group attempts to 
1 Moreover, for liberal nationalists like Kymlicka and for Herder alike, we are not just embedded in cultures, 
but in national cultures. Kymlicka uses culture as synonymous with ‘nation’ or ‘people’ (1995: 18). Herder also 
uses ‘people’ (Volk) and ‘nation’ interchangeably. He understands the nation as a cultural entity with a shared 
language as its essential feature (Herder XIII: 257–258; 363–365).
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silence individuals who seek to change the character of culture, are illegitimate from a liberal point of 
view (Kymlicka 1995: 104–105). They are illegitimate because they are freedom-destroying instead of 
freedom-enhancing. The resulting liberal nationalism2 can be understood as a nationalism that has 
been stripped off anything illiberal. Nationalistic politics are not aggressive against other national iden-
tities and typically expose a ‘thin’ or open conception of national identity.3  So Kymlicka’s version of the 
freedom argument can be characterized as a liberal romanticism: it gives a distinctively liberal shape to 
the argument, and it sanitizes romanticism from its illiberal off-shoots by formulating liberal limits to 
what can be demanded in the name of multiculturalism. It would therefore be wrong to see Kymlicka 
as a romantic theorist pur sang. But Kymlicka and Herder (and the Hamann-Herder-Humboldt tradi-
tion more generally) are united in the account given of the value of cultural membership. This account 
serves for both as the ground for the political concern for cultural groups. It holds that individuals are 
not fully formed beings prior to having language and culture: individuals need their situated horizon. 
Language is not simply a tool for communication; it influences our cognitive constitution and thereby 
structures our life options. And individuals have a legitimate interest in the protection of their linguistic 
and cultural life-world. Kymlicka takes this romantic account, liberalizes it, and put it at heart of a com-
prehensive political theory of multiculturalism.
 
FREEDOM IN A PARTICULAR LANGUAGE  
The romantic tradition is radically different from another tradition of linguistic justice: the French revo-
lutionary take on language policy. Understanding the difference between both traditions is helpful to 
understand, and rebut, an objection levelled against Kymlicka (which I deal with below) about the rea-
son why particular languages and cultures are to be respected. Revolutionary ideologists like Barère, 
2 Liberal nationalisms often acknowledge their indebtedness to Herder. Yael Tamir (1993) has argued that liberal 
nationalism “is a direct descendant of the cultural pluralism of Herder” (1993: 79). And Taylor, who is character-
ized as a liberal nationalist by Kymlicka (2001: 210) mentions Herder as one of his most important intellectual 
fathers (1993: 135–139).
3 Herder is not generally seen as a central theorist of liberalism. At the same time, Herder upholds the impor-
tance of the rights and interests of individuals. Herders’ nationalism can also be called liberal in the sense of 
moderate. It is not based on racial or ethnic criteria but on linguistic and cultural ones. And both Herder’s 
and Kymlicka’s versions of nationalism grant group-differentiated rights such as self-government rights to 
national minorities, instead of seeking to assimilate minorities within a statewide nationalism. It is a common 
criticism that romantic political theories tend to limit the moral community to the national community and 
thus ignore the moral duties they have to individuals of other nations (see Larmore 1996: 54–56). But this 
characterization does not apply to Herder, who systematically grounds his nationalism in the universal moral 
equality of individuals and their shared Humanität (e.g. XIII: 346). And Herder clearly spoke against state poli-
cies that seek to crush nations within it. He instead defends the idea that each people with a shared language 
and national character should form a distinct state (XIII: 384–385). In fact, Herder’s nationalism is essentially 
anti-imperialist in nature – his passionate anti-colonialism was grounded in the idea that nations are to be 
self-determining. Note that this is close to the justification offered by Kymlicka for a moderate nationalism. 
Compare for instance Herder’s idea of a dam against being engulfed by others (ein Damm gegen fremde 
Überschwemmungen), with Kymlicka’s statement that “[i]t is one thing to learn from the larger world; it is an-
other thing to be swamped by it, and self-government rights may be needed for smaller nations to control the 
direction and rate of change” (Herder XVIII: 236; Kymlicka 1995: 104). More generally, Kymlicka legitimates his 
normative proposal to grant national cultures distinct political units of their own within multinational states as 
external protections against the impact of bigger or more powerful nations within the same state. They allow 
the group “to protect its distinct existence and identity by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger 
society” (Kymlicka 1995: 36). But despite the fact that Herder can be called liberal in the sense of ‘moderate’, 
he did not work out a defence of culture from within the liberal tradition, nor did he formulate liberal limits to 
what is entitled in the name of culture. Instead, in Kymlicka’s work, liberalism functions both as an engine and 
as a filter for nationalist demands, and both dimensions are not present in Herder. For an account of Herder’s 
liberal credentials, see Patten 2010.
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Grégoire, Duhamel, Talleyrand, and others were concerned with language, and with the role language 
plays in the thought process. They were convinced that the success of the revolution depended in part 
on its ability to eradicate vague language and to purify the language from confusions and sources of 
misunderstanding. Their solution was to purify French and to spread it all over France. This purification 
entailed ‘revolutionizing’ French by weeding out synonyms and confusing manners of speech, and by 
producing an unambiguous spelling, grammar and dictionary. And its spreading, they thought, neces-
sitated the eradication of linguistic diversity, especially resulting from diversity of patois and of foreign 
languages on French territory. The title of l’Abbé Grégoire’s report presented to and accepted by the 
Assemblée nationale in 1794 – Rapport sur la nécessité et les moyens d’anéantir les patois’ – illustrates this 
commitment to remove the patois.  Because language and thought are connected, linguistic diversity 
within a state implies to the existence of groups with distinct political and other ideas. The patois made 
30 peoples out of one people, argued l’Abbé Grégoire (2002: 337 [1794]). This has negative consequenc-
es. It leads for example to a lack of cohesion and stability. And it is incompatible with the revolutionary 
ideal of equality because social equality implies linguistic homogeneity: people must be confronted 
with the same ideas and life opportunities. Instead France ought to be linguistically unified.
So these revolutionary theorists advocated a policy of unilingualism on the basis of the idea that 
knowledge is influenced by language. They wanted to liberate patois speakers from the yoke of their 
locality by destroying the patois and by assimilating its speakers into French. They posited that the 
ideas of patois speakers and speakers of foreign languages were intertwined with their local linguistic 
background (see e.g. Grégoire 2002: 336, 348), and they assumed the choice-structuring function of 
language. But they did not believe that this function was a reason for protecting local languages. In-
stead, they saw it as a reason to engage in the very opposite of protecting local languages: to eliminate 
those languages and to liberate speakers from their narrow background. They assumed that language 
structures choice, but they did not hold that language is therefore protection-worthy. It is with regard 
to this second element that the romantic tradition strongly diverges from the French-revolutionary 
outlook. Romantic theorists like Herder, and many contemporary multiculturalists alike, premise their 
argument for language recognition on the argument that people’s choice sets are bound up with their 
native language and culture. French revolutionaries shared that premise but instead argued for lan-
guage policies that disconnect people from their life-world so as to assimilate them into another. They 
did so for non-identity reasons such as equality, state cohesion or the political success of revolutionary 
ideas. In doing so, they are similar to contemporary liberals like Brian Barry (2001), Thomas Pogge (2003) 
or Daniel Weinstock (2003), who argue for intervening in cultural affairs in such a way that non-identity 
values such as socioeconomic equality (Barry and Pogge) or democracy (Barry and Weinstock) are pro-
moted, which for them often means promoting the state’s majority language.4 
This contrast between the romantic and the French revolutionary traditions of linguistic justice lies 
at the heart of an objection addressed at Kymlicka’s multiculturalism. One of the most frequently lev-
elled objections to the freedom argument – the argument that one needs a cultural-linguistic context 
to be presented with options to choose from in life – is that it cannot ground a right to a specific culture. 
The freedom argument may establish the need to ensure access to a cultural-linguistic context. But 
how does it justify protecting one’s own language and culture, rather than assimilating people into the 
life-world of another culture? For example, Margalit and Halbertal (1994) have argued that Kymlicka’s 
understanding of culture as a precondition of individual freedom can only justify a right to culture, not 
a right to a particular culture. They argue that if a minority culture would be destroyed by the pres-
ence of a larger majority culture and if the members of the culture have the opportunity to assimilate 
(against their will), Kymlicka cannot object since the new culture can equally function as a context for 
individual choice (for this critique, see also Forst 1997: 66; Galeotti 2002: 208; van Leeuwen 2006). If 
this objection is correct, then the argument for culture is consistent with two possible outcomes: the 
4 To be sure, they are not advocating the removal of minority languages, as Grégoire and Barère did. 
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romantic/Kymlickean outcome to protect people’s own cultures and the French revolutionary outcome 
to pursue assimilation into a language and culture of wider opportunities and of democracy. So the ar-
gument can cash out both as multiculturalism and as non-multiculturalism. It is therefore unclear what 
role the freedom argument plays in grounding multiculturalism.
Can the argument for cultural recognition based on the romantic/Kymlickean freedom argument 
answer this objection? I see two strategies for it to overcome the assimilation critique. The first strategy 
is to supplement the argument with another culture-determining argument. For example, Kymlicka has 
argued in a footnote in Politics in the Vernacular that identity considerations provide a basis for specify-
ing which culture will provide the relevant context for the context of choice (or autonomy) argument:
I admit that my argument here was unclear, but what I meant to argue was that considerations of identity pro-
vide a way of concretizing our autonomy-based interest in culture. In principle, either the minority’s own cul-
ture or the dominant culture could satisfy people’s autonomy-interest in culture, but considerations of identity 
provide powerful reasons for tying people’s autonomy-interest to their own culture. Identity does not displace 
autonomy as a defence of cultural rights, but rather provides a basis for specifying which culture will provide the 
context for autonomy (Kymlicka 2001: 55, n. 7).
In this view, the freedom/autonomy interest can be satisfied within any culture: minority members 
could realize it in the minority culture and as well as in the majority culture. But the minority members 
bring an extra interest to the table to show why the freedom interest is to be realized in the minority 
language: identity interest in the minority culture.
This is also the approach taken by Chaim Gans (2003), who takes the two as independent argu-
ments. In Gans’s approach, people have a fundamental interest in freedom, as well as in being re-
spected for, and not humiliated by, their identity (2003: 43). By the culture of their identity, Gans and 
Kymlicka mean the particular culture that people want to adhere to: it is the culture of their preference 
(2003: 43). So both Gans and Kymlicka refer to two arguments for group-differentiated rights: freedom 
and identity. 
This dual approach successfully avoids the Margalit and Halbertal critique. But one problem with 
it is the normative status of the identity argument. It is not immediately clear why the fact that an 
individual or group has an identity in X is a reason for X to be required by justice. This reason may pos-
sibly be provided, but the overall argument is then no longer as intimately tied to liberalism itself. The 
argumentative virtue of the freedom argument is its intrinsic connection to liberalism’s core value of 
freedom. This allowed Kymlicka to marry liberalism with multiculturalism, by connecting the liberal em-
phasis on choice with culture as a context of choice: if you are a liberal, you have to care about cultures. 
It is however not as immediately clear how satisfying identity interest is tied to the liberal project. It is 
compatible with liberalism to do so but does not seem required by it. We need an additional argument 
to say why identity is important. By appealing to a value (identity) that is not as directly connected 
to liberalism, it leaves the path open for a liberal to take the freedom but not the identity interest on 
board. So the success of the argument now hinges on the strength of that additional argument as to 
why identity matters. And it is not immediately evident that that argument can be a liberal one.
Moreover, the fact that the freedom argument cannot do the work in itself in this view opens up 
the argument to other criticisms. For there are other auxiliary arguments that are equally compati-
ble with liberalism and also provide a basis for determining in which culture to realize the freedom 
interest. The French revolutionary arguments are examples. If, as Grégoire, Barry and Pogge have it, 
socioeconomic equality is to provide that basis, then the right language policy towards minorities may 
entail doing what we can to make them realize their freedom interest in the majority language, which 
gives speakers better socioeconomic opportunities. Another auxiliary argument is democracy: since 
democracy may function better in a unilingual environment, we might seek to ensure that French 
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speakers in Canada realize their freedom interest in English so as to ensure a smooth Canada-wide 
English public sphere. 
In short, taking the freedom interest to ground the right to ‘a’ culture and the identity interest to 
ground the right to a ‘specific’ culture introduces theoretical hybridity into the argument. That hy-
bridity decreases the argument’s liberal credentials, and, especially, it makes it a straightforward move 
to counterbalance the identity argument with non-identity arguments such as stability, equality or 
democracy that may point towards the majority language and culture as the best location determiner 
for the satisfaction of the freedom interest.
The second strategy, which I prefer and will now lay out, resists the move to understand the free-
dom interest as inherently lacking a location determiner. It argues that the freedom interest cannot be 
satisfied within any culture but instead requires the individual’s own culture. 
In the romantic tradition, language and culture open up a life-world. They do so by situating an 
individual and presenting her with particular choices to choose from. Inside the room that language 
is a key to, one is presented with particular values, beliefs and options.5 For example, growing up in a 
language and culture, one is presented with particular traditions in literature or a specific history focus 
in schools. One is also introduced to particular metaphors, political catch phrases, historical narratives 
that help structure one’s life choices and opinions. 
As a result, individuals who have grown up in a specific language and culture have selected op-
tions from that particular life-world and developed life options that are meaningful within the context 
of that culture. Once they have begun to make their own life choices, the intelligibility and the exercise 
of these choices require the continued availability of the cultural-linguistic choice-set. The person they 
have become depends on the particular choice set offered by their own culture, and requires that cul-
ture for their choices and personality to continue to make sense. So the life choices, desires, values and 
beliefs of individuals are entwined with the particular language(s) one speaks.
Therefore, to impose a different language and culture on people who are already situated in a 
cultural context, through linguistic and cultural assimilation, would imperil their freedom. Not only 
would they face linguistic difficulties to understand the new values. They would also be cut off from 
access to options that are meaningful to them and from the life-world in which their life choices make 
sense. This would result in ‘loss of world’, in alienation. They might rebuild it in some way, by reintro-
ducing parts of their values in the new cultural group, by translating metaphors and by developing a 
distinctive minority accent in the new language. But it would be a form of patching up, and the loss 
of freedom is beyond complete repair. Once we take the idea seriously that our culture structures our 
choices, the freedom interest not only grounds the idea that individuals need a language, but also that 
they need their own language, which is the language of their parents and of their fellow speakers and 
cultural members. 
That a life-world can be destroyed through linguistic assimilation does not mean that life-worlds 
cannot integrate new material. Cultural mediators and translators bring along new stories, concepts and 
ideas. There are also new phenomena, such as technologies or natural events. They too are added to the 
language, and embedded in the linguistic and cultural horizon. This adding of external or new ideas to a 
5 Of course multilingual people can frequent other rooms, and bring back newly acquired ideas and describe 
them to the fellow speakers of the language.
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language and culture, however, does not call into question the ‘framework idea’ of language and culture 
– the fact that linguistic and cultural options come in the form of a comprehensive package.6 
I hope to have made it credible that, in my version of it, the freedom argument does the work on its 
own, and does not require an auxiliary argument. It has therefore parsimonious virtue compared with 
the bifurcated approach. It contains both the ‘what’ and the ‘where’: it says what culture provides to 
the individual (access to a situated context of choice) and has an in-built location determiner (the cul-
ture that provides the content is the one in which the individual has grown up and in connection with 
which she has developed and connected her life choices). French-style liberal assimilationism is thereby 
ruled out: the ‘romantic’ nature of the freedom argument grants people a right to their own language. 
Moreover, the fact that the argument for the value of culture is based purely on the freedom argument 
retains a tighter fit within liberalism’s core principles, and allows for the conclusion that group-differen-
tiated rights are required by liberalism rather than being merely compatible with it.
FUTURE ASSIMILATION
At this point we must consider an objection to this self-standing interpretation of the freedom argu-
ment. One might question if the ‘romantic’ interpretation of the freedom account fully escapes the 
assimilation critique. The self-standing version only works, one might object, for currently living peo-
ple. It does not apply to future people who have not yet connected their life projects with a particular 
context of choice. This objection can come in two versions.
The first version states that the freedom interest of new-borns could be exercised in any culture. 
New-borns and future unborn generations don’t have a particular context of choice yet, so they might 
be inculcated with any culture and language. My argument above that the freedom interest can be 
self-standing depends on the fact that people’s past expectations and life choices were made in refer-
ence to an already existing choice-set. But that choice-set is not there yet for future people. 
At the same time, however, new-borns are dependent children who need parents. Parents do 
have a language and life-world, and they have a responsibility to help their children navigate their way 
6 Against Kymlicka’s argument, Jeremy Waldron has argued that even though options are culturally mediated, 
“it does not follow that there must be one cultural framework in which each available option is assigned a 
meaning. Meaningful options may come to us as items or fragments from a variety of cultural sources” (Wal-
dron 1992: 783). I think it is important to recognize the possibility of having more than one linguistic-cultural 
framework. Indeed, in multilingual areas like in Catalonia, Brussels, or Singapore, it is far from uncommon 
to find people who have two or more linguistic and national ‘contexts of choice’. Kymlicka has not explicitly 
thematised this possibility in his theory (see for this criticism De Schutter 2011). But admitting the possibility of 
having two linguistic-cultural life-worlds does not damage the freedom argument in itself. From the fact that 
individuals may have two linguistic-cultural frameworks, it does not follow that that the idea of a linguistic-cul-
tural framework does not make sense. A bilingual Catalan-Spanish citizen will integrate foreign elements like 
originally Indian yoga and Korean-produced smartphones, and both the Catalan and Spanish frameworks can 
integrate such elements within their web of beliefs and existing options, bestowing meaning upon it. Inter-
national politics will be reported in the newspaper in Spanish and in Catalan, and both languages embed the 
content of the news in their own framework of metaphors and linguistic particularities. It is also possible for 
certain elements to be integrated more by one than by the other linguistic horizon. And when this bilingual 
citizen reads a Scandinavian novel, she will do so in a version translated in one of the languages she masters. 
As Kymlicka argues (1995: 85), that an Irish-American eats Chinese foods and reads her children Grimm’s Fairy-
Tales “is not moving between societal cultures. Rather it is enjoying the opportunities provided by the diverse 
societal culture which characterizes the Anglophone society of the United States.” The fact that it is possible 
to be a full member of two societal cultures does not call Kymlicka’s freedom argument into question: it just 
means that freedom can be realized in two cultures. So, Waldron is right to say that meaningful options come 
to us from a variety of cultural sources. And there is indeed no need to assume that one can only have one 
life-world. But these are all compatible with holding the the importance of there being culturally and linguis-
tically mediated life-worlds that do structure options. There must not be one cultural framework, but each 
framework one is a member of structures options in a particular way. 
Helder DE SCHUTTER
59
4 4  •  2 0 1 6
around in their particular society or culture until they are grown up and are able to autonomously steer 
their life course. It is hard to see how parents could do so without transferring knowledge of a particu-
lar set of expectations, stories and metaphors. This enables the children to speak a language fluently 
and have a ‘mother-tongue’, to grow up with the parents’ stories, with the childhood songs that the 
parents know, with the often implicit values and expectations that exist within a life-world, and so on. 
The children have both emotional and cognitive needs that the parents must provide, and, other things 
being equal, the best location for the children’s freedom interest is their parents’ culture. As the case of 
adoption shows, a child can grow up in any language; but it is important that they know the language 
of the people they grow up with. For new-borns the freedom interest is realizable in any culture (as op-
posed to that of people who have already grown up in a specific culture) but it is the parental bond that 
provides the reason for locating its realization within the specific culture that the parents are raised in.
Yet, apart from new-borns, contexts of choice can and do change: the contexts of choice of current 
generations are not identical to that of their grandparents. The second version of the objection states 
that the language and culture of future generations can become structurally unrecognizable to us due 
to ongoing intergenerational cultural change. So the assimilation objection still retains some force with 
regard to the future shape of a culture’s structure. Is it not legitimate for the group’s cultural structure 
to change, or even entirely disappear? 
To answer this we must follow the logic of the freedom argument as the theoretical engine of 
the liberal case for group-differentiated rights. The freedom argument holds that individuals must be 
given a context of choice from within which they can choose their own life options. This context of 
choice can change. And that change can occur both character-wise, as far as its values and beliefs are 
concerned, and structure-wise, as far as the cultural structure or the existence itself of the culture is 
concerned (Kymlicka 1989: 167). Character-wise, as far as the content and the values of the cultures 
are concerned, a culture could evolve from Christian to secular or from agrarian to post-industrial. As 
Kymlicka argues, it “is right and proper that the character of a culture change as a result of the choices 
of its members” (1995: 104). 
But it could also legitimately change its structure (a possibility not explicitly discussed by Kymlicka, 
see 1995: 104-105). It is possible that, in the course of a few centuries, language A changes to such an 
extent that it could no longer be understood by the earlier speakers of A, while the freedom interest of 
its speakers is never harmed. 15th century Dutch and contemporary Dutch are not mutually intelligible, 
due to the linguistic evolution Dutch has undergone. From the point of view of the freedom argument, 
nothing is problematic about such a structural change, as long as the change occurs gradually and 
does not leave living speakers of the previous structural stage behind. It is also possible for a part of 
a language or cultural group to develop a distinct language and culture of its own, thereby radically 
changing the boundaries of the existing cultural structure, for example by developing a dialect of lan-
guage into a self-standing language.
So the second articulation of the objection is correct. The self-standing interpretation of the free-
dom argument only applies to currently living people: it cannot protect a culture from changing quite 
radically over the course of time. There is nothing wrong with changes in the cultural values or struc-
ture. The freedom argument does not rule out such changes.
I have just given an example of a case in which the cultural character or structure changes in such a 
way that a significant difference exists between the culture at different points in time. It is also possible 
for the life-world to remain similar but for the people to shift between two different life-worlds. Indeed, 
over a few generations, the life-world could for example move from language A to language B, while at 
each single instance in time fully providing a context of choice to individuals. As Alan Patten has argued:
Imagine that language L did gradually decline in use – to the extent that it fell below the threshold in which it 
offers a context of choice. It would be a mistake to conclude from this fact alone that L-speakers would be left 
without a context of choice. It would only be unilingual L-speakers who would necessarily have lost their context 
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of choice since multilingual L-speakers may find meaningful options and opportunities in other languages. And 
the very same processes that generated the decline in usage of L in the first place – the massive attraction of 
some other language, for instance – would help to ensure that there are very few unilingual L-speakers (Patten 
2001: 707–708). 
Provided the change indeed occurs at a slow enough rate, freedom-enabling contexts of choice can 
adjust in such a way that no-one experiences significant lacks of freedom. For example, in areas where 
two languages exist of which one is more dominant than the other, often the children born to parents 
with different first languages are bilingual, but the grandchildren already lean towards the dominant 
language. A language shift can then occur relatively smoothly, with at no point leaving individuals 
stranded without a context of choice. Van Parijs has summarized this ‘Laponce law’ of unilinguali-
zation after a few generations as: “The nicer people are with one another, the nastier languages are 
with each other” (Van Parijs 2000: 219; Laponce 2001: 188–189). This law partly explains the radical 
transformation of Brussels from predominantly Dutch at the end of the 19th century to predominantly 
French a century later. 
In short, people’s cultures and languages can change in two ways. Either the culture or language 
itself evolves, as in the differences between 15th century Dutch and contemporary Dutch. Or people 
could slowly change their structure and values from one to another culture or language, as in Brussels 
many ancestors of contemporary speakers of French (often with Dutch surnames) have done. And it 
is possible for each generation to have a fully comprehensive context of choice, either at some point 
within the internal evolution of a language and culture, or at some point on the continuum between 
unilingualism in language A and unilingualism in language B. So the freedom argument is compatible 
with such changes, provided they don’t occur overnight. 
That the freedom argument is compatible with such changes does not necessarily mean they 
ought to be encouraged; we might seek to block them. Yet such changes ought not always to be seen 
as regrettable. As we saw before (and as Kymlicka) acknowledges, languages and cultures not only 
provide a context of freedom but also serve non-identity purposes such as equality and democracy. 
We may sometimes judge that the non-identity reasons for sharing a particular context of choice are so 
compelling that it is desirable to seek to adapt the structure of the culture in such a way that non-identi-
ty purposes are served in addition to freedom interests. This will often clash with ethnocultural justice, 
since it may lead to the ‘revolutionary’ linguistic assimilation strategy that the freedom argument is 
supposed to withstand. Yet in some cases I think we should allow for such a conclusion in a way that 
doesn’t negate the freedom argument. I will give two examples of such cases: that of intralinguistic 
differences within a language in the form of regional dialects, and that of building a European identity.
What does the freedom argument say in the context of dialects? In a typical linguistic situation 
marked by a standard version of the language (such as standard German) that is functionally super-
posed over different regional dialects (such as Bavarian), the linguistic context of choice will be partly 
provided for by the standard version. The standard version is usually the language of the public sphere, 
of media, of political life, of universities, and of schools. As a result, individuals partly satisfy the free-
dom interest through the standard language. 
Of course, there are historical reasons for why the freedom interest is already partly realized 
through the standard language: it is the result of the success of linguistic nation-building. The modern 
nation-state has over the course of its history attempted to unite the citizenry and to create a common 
national language. The current result of this history of nation-building and standardization is, in the 
usual case, the existence of a ‘diglossic’ context of choice: while for certain freedom-related functions 
such as family relationships the dialect provides a context of choice, for others like political engage-
ment or for written sources, the standard is the normal choice (Ferguson 1959). It is common to have 
two such choice contexts at once, and even for one (the standard) to be clearly dominant in terms of 
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status, as it is the standard version that receives the lion share of state recognition (in public schools, in 
the laws, in the courts, and so on). 
There clearly are non-identity benefits to be had from having a standard language and from 
spreading its knowledge among the population. These include efficiency, democracy (which is easier 
when there is a shared language version that is mutually understood) as well as equality (as a larger job 
market, and better socioeconomic mobility, are enabled this way). 
Yet, in some cases dialects may be strong, big or widespread enough to be able to in principle 
sustain a full context of choice in the dialect alone. Bavarian, a group of German dialects, is an example, 
and its 14 million speakers make it a more widely spoken language than for example Danish or Greek, 
which each provide full choice contexts. In such cases, the freedom argument is compatible with lend-
ing full political support to the dialect. But it is also perfectly compatible with seeking to maintain the 
current diglossic situation with the standard version having most of the status and state recognition. 
So the choice for dialectal dominance or standard dominance, then, cannot be based on the freedom 
argument alone. That choice can also be informed by non-identity arguments. This dialect/standard 
discussion shows, I think, that contexts of choice can be layered in the sense that individuals have 
freedom interests in two language versions: both in the standard and in the dialect. And it makes sense 
to seek to avoid only having such interests in the local dialect, to maintain the standard version of the 
language, and to spread its knowledge among the speakers of the dialect.  
My second example of a case where the malleability of the freedom interest should not be seen 
as a problem is the attempt in Europe to build a European identity in addition to existing national 
identities. Kymlicka’s view is that we should not make EU institutions directly accountable. Indirect ac-
countability is more appropriate. The result is a form of representation with the national representative 
as a medium between the people of the member state and the European decision-making body. This 
is the intergovernmental view of the EU: the EU is steered by the nation-states, such as in the European 
Council. It stands in contrast to the supra-national view of the EU, in which a direct relationship be-
tween individuals and EU institutions and representatives is fostered, such as by granting more powers 
to the directly elected European Parliament rather than to intergovernmental organs like the Council. 
In Kymlicka’s view, citizens debate at the national level how they want their national governments and 
representatives to act in intergovernmental contexts (2001: 317–326).  Freedom, equality and democ-
racy are best exercised within national-cultural-linguistic units, such as within the Danish, Catalan or 
Flemish units, and not directly at the European level. 
While I fully agree that national-cultural choice contexts are to be protected and are entitled to 
political autonomy, I do not share this normative disagreement with European supra-nationalism. The 
national-cultural groups all came into existence through active nation-building efforts. Kymlicka also 
defends nation-building policies for currently existing nations, provided the policies are liberal. But 
he is not prepared to pursue nation-building or identity-building at levels above the nation. It is not 
clear to me, however, why existing nations have a privileged position here. If recent processes of glo-
balization and Europeanization are creating a new civil society in Europe (Kymlicka 2001: 326), and also 
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to some extent new identity structures,7 there is no reason within the liberal nationalist preoccupation 
with the importance of identities to inhibit the nascent emergence of a European supranational ‘life-
world’ (enabled by for example a European culture, Europe-wide cross-national mobility, or shared 
European symbols) fully compatible with the continued importance national life-worlds. Yet, even if 
this choice context is still very tentative or fragile, there may be non-identity reasons unrelated to the 
freedom argument – though compatible with it – to stimulate the development of such a supranational 
cultural layer. Within the European context one might argue, for instance, that a strong European iden-
tity might help foster the development of a generous redistribution from richer to poorer regions, or 
even simply to uphold existing schemes of (limited) intra-EU solidarity as exemplified in the European 
scheme to uphold a plan to share the burden of the influx of asylum seekers in Europe, or support for 
bailing out Greece, or even simply to help sustain the solidarity between net contributors to the EU like 
the Netherlands or Sweden and net beneficiaries like Poland or Hungary (Cipriani 2014: 14–15). 
The answer to the question whether we should stimulate an EU identity layer depends on what 
one thinks the EU is to do, and whether EU-wide redistribution is desirable. My (unargued for) norma-
tive premise is the desirability of extending the project of distributive justice beyond the nation-state, 
and I support the emergence of an EU layer of distributive justice that redistributes wealth between 
richer and poorer nations and individuals within the EU (while EU-distribution is in my view itself only 
a stepping-stone towards global distributive justice). In this view, we should support a supranational 
view of the EU. Other views about the normative goal of the EU may indeed lead to less ambitious takes 
on the need for EU identity. However, a full answer to whether EU redistribution is desirable requires 
a more worked out normative theory of the EU, and of distributive justice, which I have not provided 
here. But the point is that this choice between fostering or withstanding EU identity-building cannot 
be made on the basis of the freedom argument alone. That argument allows for both an intergovern-
mental and a supranational conclusion, for keeping identity local and for fostering an EU-wide identity. 
It is ultimately the non-identity arguments that normatively point to the desirable future location of 
the context of choice. 
These two examples of dialect/standard choice contexts and the desirability of an additional Euro-
pean identity layer show, in my view, that it is compatible with the freedom argument, and sometimes 
desirable, to steer future generations’ freedom contexts in a certain direction. The freedom argument 
does not need a supplementary argument to block assimilation into another culture since existing 
people’s choice contexts are entangled with the particular culture they adhere to. But this is not true 
for future generations’ projects, so we do need to involve additional arguments for determining the 
desirable future location of the choice context. Two prominent such supplementary arguments are 
equality and democracy. Of course, these supplementary arguments may uniquely support the current 
7 While European identity surely is significantly weaker than national identities, it does nonetheless exist. It even 
exists in a way that resembles national identity positions in multinational states: many citizens have dual iden-
tities, others have only national identities and still others uniquely conceive of themselves as European citizens. 
8% of Europeans self-define as ‘European only’ or ‘European and national; 38% self-identifies as ‘national only’, 
and 52% see themselves as ‘national and European’ (Eurobarometer Spring 2015). It is therefore not the case 
that the EU suffers from a problem that the member states by definition don’t have. Several EU member states 
are multinational states, such as Belgium, Spain or the United Kingdom: they contain more than one nation and 
have sought to politically accommodate such national identities in envisioning their own unity. These multina-
tional states themselves can be understood to have a state-wide demos alongside sub-state national demoi. 
Citizens may be members of more than one national community at once (such as of the Spanish and of the 
Catalan nation simultaneously), and different individuals of the same ‘nation’ may be internally divided with 
regard to which context is the most relevant one (38.7% of Flemish respondents in a 2014 survey answered 
that they self-identify as much with Flanders as with Belgium; 31.1% self-identified only as Flemish or more as 
Flemish than Belgian; 29.8% only as Belgian or more as Belgian than Flemish, see Swyngedouw et al. 2015). The 
practices of such multinational states and the nested identities they make possible offer an example of the type 
of practice we can and in my view ought to pursue at the level of the European Union. 
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context location. But in many cases the supplementary arguments will point in a different direction. In 
such cases difficult trade-off assessments must be made. The dialect/standard and the EU examples are 
in my view two cases where new choice contexts have been (in the case of the standard language) and 
can be (in the EU) stimulated, without destroying or diminishing existing choice contexts. In both cases 
I think the attempts are desirable. 
In conclusion, the freedom argument in the self-standing version I have defended can resist the 
linguistic assimilation conclusion for the current generation and also for new-borns. Current genera-
tions perceive their options and have devised their life plans in reference to a specific cultural context 
– that in which they were brought up. Assimilating them into another culture obfuscates their options, 
and makes their life plans less meaningful. And it is in the interest of new-borns to be raised in the 
language and culture of current generations. But while the freedom interest protects the language 
and culture of current and near-future generations, it cannot, on its own, withstand a very long-term 
project of adding a cultural context. If there are good non-identity reasons for doing so, and provided 
such long-term changes occur slowly enough and don’t imperil currently existing choice contexts, they 
can be legitimate. 
CONCLUSION
We can see Kymlicka’s project as having married liberalism with the romantic idea that language 
and culture open up a distinct life-world. Individuals who grow up in it have a legitimate interest in 
state recognition for their language and culture, as a means of preserving their context of choice. 
We do not need additional arguments to safeguard the realization of this freedom interest within 
individual’s own cultures as opposed to any culture, since their chosen choice set is dependent on 
and attuned to their own culture. Yet in some cases we may seek to add new choice contexts if there 
are good non-identity reasons for doing so. Provided that existing choice contexts continue to be 
protected, and the non-identity arguments are compelling, we ought to sometimes do so, and the 
liberal linguistic turn accomplished by Kymlicka allows for it. 
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POVZETEK
LIBERALNI LINGVISTIČNI OBRAT: PREGLED KYMLICKOVEGA ARGUMENTA SVOBODE
Helder DE SCHUTTER
Podobno kot je knjiga A Theory of Justice Johna Rawlsa izhodiščno delo teorije pravičnosti, predstavlja 
knjiga Willa Kymlicke, Liberalism, Community and Culture eno od najpomembnejših del na vsebinskem 
področju varovanja manjšin ter ostalih etnokulturnih skupin oz. kulturne pravičnosti nasploh. V tej 
knjigi (ter podrobneje v svoji knjigi Multicultural Citizenship) je Kymlicka artikuliral teorijo manjšinskih 
pravic, ki ponudi alternativo standardnemu liberalnemu pojmovanju državljanske enakosti ter s tem 
povezano razumevanje kulturne različnosti. Članek ponovno premisli glavni Kymlickin argument 
zveze med liberalizmom in multikulturalizmom: da liberalno vrednotenje svobode zahteva kulturni 
kontekst izbire. Hkrati članek pokaže, da ta argument svobode temelji na romantični filozofiji jezika. 
Kritiki  omenjenega argumenta so namreč poudarili, da svobode ne zagotavlja nujno posameznikova 
lastna kultura, temveč jo lahko omogoči katerakoli kultura. Avtor na omenjene kritike poda roman-
tično-Kymlickijanski odgovor, s katerim pokaže prepletenost posameznikovih življenjskih odločitev s 
tisto kulturo, ki določa njegov kontekst izbire. Toda medtem ko ta današnje posameznike varuje pred 
asimilacijo, prihodnjim generacijam ne preprečuje izbire dodatnega kulturnega konteksta. Počasni 
medgeneracijski asimilacijski projekti niso nujno zaskrbljujoči, saj lahko poleg omogočanja svobode 
prispevajo k uresničevanju z identiteto nepovezanih vrednot.
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